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ANTITRUST’S UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICS
Daniel A. Crane†

INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law stands at its most fluid and negotiable
moment in a generation. The bipartisan consensus that
antitrust should solely focus on economic efficiency and
consumer welfare has quite suddenly come under attack
from prominent voices calling for a dramatically
enhanced role for antitrust law in mediating a variety of
social, economic, and political friction points, including
employment, wealth inequality, data privacy and
security, and democratic values. To the bewilderment of
many observers, the ascendant pressures for antitrust
reforms are flowing from both wings of the political
spectrum, throwing into confusion a conventional
understanding that pro-antitrust sentiment tacked left
and antitrust laissez faire tacked right.
On the left, the assault on the consumer-welfareoriented status quo has migrated from reformist
organizations like the Open Markets Institute1 and anticorporate progressives like senators Elizabeth Warren
and Bernie Sanders to the House Democratic
Leadership, which has staked the 2018 mid-term
†Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of
Michigan.
1 https://openmarketsinstitute.org/.
Open Markets was
affiliated with the left-leaning New America Foundation, until forced
out over Open Markets’s criticisms of Google, a New America
patron. Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic Ousted from Think Tank
Funded by the Tech Giant, New York Times, August 30, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidtgoogle-new-america.html.
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elections on an economic platform including antitrust
reform as a centerpiece.2 In the Democratic Party’s
center, the formation of a House Antitrust Caucus3 and
reform bills introduced in both the House4 and the
Senate5 underscore increasing political traction to
jettison the consumer welfare status quo.
The
Democrats’ “Better Deal” plank asserts that consumers
are but one of the classes that antitrust should protect,
with workers, suppliers, and small business taking an
equal place in the protected class.6 Significantly, the
document launches harsh criticisms of the past thirty
years of antitrust enforcement as excessively lax—a
period over which Democrats ran antitrust enforcement
just over half of the time. The Democratic leadership
has made clear that it does not intend to exclude the
Clinton and Obama administrations from its criticism,
that it intends to advocate a major, trans-partisan
rethinking of antitrust policy.7
U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, A
Better Deal: Crack Down on Corporate Monopolies & the Abuse of
Economic
and
Political
Power,
https://abetterdeal.democraticleader.gov/crack-down-on-abuse-ofpower/
3 Tess Townsend, Keith Ellison and the New Antitrust Caucus
Want to Know Exactly How Bad Mergers Have Been for the American
Public,
http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/12/antitrust-bill-fromkeith-ellison-seek-info-on-mergers.html.
4 21st Century Competition Commission Act, H.R. 4686,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4686;
Merger
Retrospective
Act,
H.R.
4538,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4538.
5 Merger Enforcement Improvement Act, 115 Cong. S. 1811,,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/1811/text.
2

6

https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017/07/ABetter-Deal-on-Competition-and-Costs-1.pdf.
7 Chuck Schumer, A Better Deal for American Workers, New
York
Times,
July
24,
2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/chuck-schumeremployment-democrats.html (“Democrats have too often hesitated
from taking on those misguided policies directly and unflinchingly
— so much so that many Americans don’t know what we stand
for.”).
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On the right, President Trump has attacked
concentrated economic power in big media8 and his
Justice Department has launched a surprising,
aggressive challenge to the AT&T/Time Warner vertical
merger. Trump’s trustbusting might be dismissed as a
feature of his idiosyncratic populism or, less charitably,
abusive vendettas against corporate political foes like
CNN and Amazon, but the reformist sentiment on the
right is far from limited to the President.
Similar
sentiments have been expressed by such diverse
conservative figures as activist Steve Bannon, who
wants to turn Google and Facebook into public utilities,9
conservative economist Kenneth Rogoff,10 and Trump’s
decided political foe Bill Kristol, who criticizes Robert
Bork’s consumer welfare standard and proposes a
significant reinvigoration of the antitrust laws to limit
the growing power of tech’s Big Five (Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft).11 The American
Conservative recently turned with surprising ferocity on
that conservative icon Bork, asserting that “[w]hereas
prior generations of lawmakers protected the American
citizenry as businessmen, entrepreneurs, and growers,
Bork led a revolution that sacrificed the small producer

Trump Says Amazon has ‘a huge antitrust problem,’ Reuters
(May 13, 2016) https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/13/trump-saysamazon-has-a-huge-antitrust-problem.html.; Trump’s comments
create a lose-lose position for Justice, Washington Post (Nov. 13,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumpscomments-create-a-lose-lose-position-forjustice/2017/11/13/6fd7b28e-c596-11e7-aae0cb18a8c29c65_story.html?utm_term=.3fa9eb549b54.
9 Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to do to Google,
The
Atlantic,
Aug.
17,
2017
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/stevebannon-google-facebook/535473/.
10 Kenneth Rogoff concerned
by the dark side of technology
revolution,
Financial
Review,
March
9,
2018,
http://www.afr.com/technology/kenneth-rogoff-concerned-by-the-dark-sideof-the-technology-revolution-20180308-h0x8n4
11
The New Center, Ideas to Re-Center America,
http://newcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/TheNewCenter_Ideasbook9_10.pdf.
8
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at the altar of efficiency and cheap goods.?”12
Standing against the anti-incumbent challengers
from both political wings is a broad, bi-partisan
establishment center seeking to defend the consumer
welfare framework. Until recently, this establishment
center seemed far from unified. Since the rise of the
Chicago School in the 1970s, antitrust law has been
contested on terms that seemed generally to track
right/left political ideology, with those on the left
favoring more aggressive intervention and those on the
right more laissez faire. But the rising tide of calls for a
radically different version of antitrust has led to a
circling of establishment wagons around the consumer
welfare standard. Left-leaning organizations that once
led the charge for more aggressive enforcement now find
themselves defending the consumer welfare idea in
principle,13 even while calling for more aggressive
enforcement within that paradigm.
Meanwhile,
conventionally conservative or pro-business leaning
organizations continue to defend the consumer welfare
standard against assaults from their own right flank.14
This Essay shows that, although unconventional in
presentist terms, the emerging political dislocations over
antitrust
policy
reflect
longstanding
ideological
ambiguities about and within the anti-monopoly
tradition. In particular, the current political fracturing
12
Daniel Kishi, Robert Bork’s America, The American
Conservative
(March
1,
2018),
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/robert-borksamerica/.
13 See Danny Vinik, Inside the New Battle Against Google,
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/09/17/openmarkets-google-antitrust-barry-lynn-000523
(reporting
on
resistance to Open Markets’ assault on consumer welfare standard
by traditionally left-leaning, pro-enforcement groups like American
Antitrust Institute and New America Foundation).
14 See, e.g.¸ Federalist Society
Antitrust & Consumer
Protection Working Group, https://regproject.org/group/antitrustconsumer-protection/ (defending consumer welfare standard); U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Competition Policy & Antitrust,
https://www.uschamber.com/competition-policy-antitrust
(“Antitrust remedies should enhance consumer welfare and make
sense in an interconnected world.”).
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over antitrust is best understood by examining three
ideological friction points that have emerged periodically
within American history: (1) the ideological ambiguity
surrounding the association between large scale in
business and government; (2) the shifting meaning of
“monopoly” from exclusive grant of government privilege
to purely private power and a related question about the
sources of monopoly power; and (3) pragmatic concerns
about the ability of the capitalist order to survive
without regulatory interventions to smooth its roughest
edges. Taken in the context of these longstanding
friction points, the strange bedfellow coalitions uneasily
rising around contemporary antitrust reform aren’t that
strange at all.
I
THE IDEOLOGICAL AMBIGUITY OF LARGE SCALE IN
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
A. Brandeis and Bork as Ideological Touchpoints
Although American antitrust policy has been
influenced by a wide variety of ideological schools,15 two
influences stand out as historically most significant to
understanding the contemporary antitrust debate. The
first is a Brandeisian school, epitomized in the title of
Louis Brandeis’ 1914 essay (subsequently made the title
of a 1934 collection of his essays) in Harper’s Weekly—
The Curse of Bigness.16
Arguing for “regulated
competition” over “regulated monopoly,” Brandeis
asserted that it was necessary to “curb[] physically the
strong, to protect those physically weaker” in order to
sustain industrial liberty.17 Brandeis evoked a
See generally DANIEL A. CRANE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE
MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY (2016).
16 Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, Harper's Wkly., Jan.
10, 1914, at 18.
17 Louis Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?
In Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at 185. On Brandeis’
influence in antitrust, see generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & Micah
15
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Jeffersonian vision of a social-economic order organized
on a small scale, with atomistic competition between a
large number of equally advantaged units. His goals
included the economic, social, and political.18
As
explained in a dissenting opinion by William O. Douglas
in the 1948 Columbia Steel case, Brandeis worried that
“size can become a menace—both industrial and social.
It can be an industrial menace because it creates gross
inequalities against existing or putative competitors. It
can be a social menace— because of its control of
prices.”19
The Brandeisian vision held sway in U.S. antitrust
from the Progressive Era through the early 1970s, albeit
with significant interruptions.20 Its spirit animates a
long chain of important cases from Chicago Board of
Trade21 in 1918 (authored by Brandeis himself) to
TOPCO in 1972,22 and a string of Congressional reforms
including the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts of 1914, the Robinson-Patman Act of 1938, and the
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.
The ascendant Chicago School of the 1960s and
70s threw down the gauntlet to the Brandeisian
tendency of U.S. antitrust law. In an early mission
statement,
Robert
Bork
and
Ward
Bowman
characterized antitrust history as “vacillat[ing] between
the policy of preserving competition and the policy of
preserving competitors from their more energetic and
efficient rivals,”23 the latter being an interpretation of the
Brandeis School. Richard Posner struck a similar note
Webber, Louis Brandeis and Contemporary Antitrust Enforcement,
33 Touro L. Rev. 277 (2017).
18 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Curse of Bigness, The Atlantic (June
3, 2016) (summarizing Brandeisian vision).
19 U.S. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
20 See, e.g., ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1995) (detailing place
of Brandeisian School among prevailing New Deal ideologies).
21 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
22 U.S. v. TOPCO Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
23 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust,
65 Colum. L.Rev. 363, 363-64 (1965).
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in his 1976 book on antitrust, asserting that “the proper
purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition,
as that term is understood in economics.”24 Chicagoans
argued that antitrust law should be concerned solely
with economic efficiency and consumer welfare (more on
these values in a moment).25 “Bigness” was no longer
necessarily a curse, but often the product of superior
efficiency. Chicago criticized Brandeis’s “sympathy for
small, perhaps inefficient, traders who might go under
in fully competitive markets.”26
Preserving a level
playing field meant stifling efficiency to enable market
participation by the mediocre.27
Beginning in 1977-78, the Chicago School achieved
an almost complete triumph in the Supreme Court, at
least in the limited sense that the Court came to adopt
the economic efficiency/consumer welfare model as the
exclusive or near exclusive goal of antitrust law
(adoption of Chicago School interpretations of consumer
welfare and policy positions on particular competitive
practices would occur neither immediately nor
completely).28 In 1979, citing Bork, the Court declared
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
‘consumer welfare prescription.’”29 Over time, the maxim
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
ix (1976).
25 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF xxx (1978).
26 Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra n. xxx at 41.
27 Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra n. xxx at 137 (“Any firm that
operates excludes rivals from some share of the market. Superior
efficiency forecloses. Indeed, exclusion is the mechanism by which
competition confers benefits on society. The more efficient exclude
the less efficient from the control of resources, and they do so only
to the degree their efficiency is superior.”). Years later, as a paid
consultant for Netscape against Microsoft, Bork would employ the
level playing field metaphor affirmatively, asserting that “[t]he object
is to create a level playing field benefiting consumers. That is what
antitrust is about . . .” Robert H. Bork, What Antitrust Is All
About, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at A19.
28 See Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1911 (2009).
29 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, XXX at 66).
24
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that antitrust law should protect “competition rather
than competitors” became canonical.30 Brandeis had
been displaced by Bork.
If the last three or four decades of U.S. antitrust
policy have largely belonged to Bork—at least at an
ideological level—the Bork vs. Brandeis dichotomy is far
from settled. The voices at the cutting edge of the rising
reformist movement—particularly those aligned with the
influential Open Markets Institute31—explicitly style
themselves as a “New Brandeis” school in order to re-up
the historic contest between the Brandeisian and
Chicago School orders.32
B. The Lingering Shadows of Jeffersonianism and
Hamiltonianism
Although it is conventional to understand Brandeis’
anti-bigness ideology as an aspect of Progressivism
standing in contrast to Chicago’s big business
conservatism, the story is historically more nuanced.
Brandeis’ preoccupation with “bigness” was not limited
to large corporate scale—he was also deeply concerned
with large governmental scale generally, and a large
scale federal government in particular. As Jeffrey Rosen
has observed, “[d]enouncing big banks as well as big
government as symptoms of what he called a ‘curse of
30 E.g., Brooke Goup Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (“It is axiomatic that the antitrust
laws
were
passed
for
‘the
protection
of competition, not competitors.’”) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
31 https://openmarketsinstitute.org/.
Open Markets was
affiliated with the left-leaning New America Foundation, until forced
out over Open Markets’s criticisms of Google, a New America
patron. Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic Ousted from Think Tank
Funded by the Tech Giant, New York Times, August 30, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidtgoogle-new-america.html.
32 David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash
Monoplies, The Nation April 4, 2017; Danny Vinik, Inside the New
Battle
Against
Google,
Politico,
September
17,
2017
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/09/17/openmarkets-google-antitrust-barry-lynn-000523.
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bigness,’ Brandeis was determined to diminish
concentrated financial and federal power, which he
viewed as a menace to liberty and democracy.”33
Brandeis styled himself a Jeffersonian, and his ideology
resonated with the Jeffersonian preference for smallscale yeomanry and localized political organization.34
In lionizing large corporate scale, the Chicago School
aligned itself with the Hamiltonian vision for a robustly
mercantile society grounded on powerful financial and
economic institutions. By doing so, Chicago always
risked alienating the libertarian right, with its affinity for
Jefferson’s vision for small scale government and
industrial production.35 Many libertarians have found it
hard to attack bloated government without also worrying
about bloated business. (Witness the rise of the Tea
Party, which arose in large part as a reaction to
corporate bailouts). Influential libertarians like Friedrich
Hayek saw a role for antitrust law in curbing
monopolistic
abuses
because
they
understood
unfettered corporate power as a threat to personal
liberty.36
The divide between the competing Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian ideals on organizational scale and their
implications for efficiency and liberty thread through
antitrust’s intellectual and ideological history, often
disrupting conventional political alignments.
Teddy
Roosevelt, a deep admirer of Hamilton, was comfortable
with large scale in both government and business. Far
from a “trustbuster,” Roosevelt opposed breaking up
Standard Oil, viewing large aggregations of capital as
inevitable and necessary—so long as superintended by a

Rosen, supra n. xxx. See also JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 1 (Yale Univ. Press 2016).
34 A. LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN
AMERICAN IDEAL 478 (1936).
35 ALBERT J. NOCK, MR. JEFFERSON (1983).
36 Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the
Crucible of United States v. Microsoft, 1 N.Y.U. J. Law & Liberty 167
(2005).
33
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strong federal government.37
Roosevelt’s affinity for
large scale government and business earned him with
epithet of “socialist.” 38 That charge was hyperbolic, but
not directionally implausible. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, American socialists looked
with suspicion on the antitrust laws because they
viewed the rise of the Gilded Age trusts as salutary
stepping stones to government appropriation of the
means of production and industry.39 Socialist
Presidential candidate Eugene Debs, himself the
defendant in an antitrust prosecution, argued:
“Monopoly is certain and sure. It is merely a question of
whether we will be collectively owned monopolies, for the
good of the race, or whether they will be privately owned
for the power, pleasure and glory of the Morgans,
Rockefellers, Guggenheims, and Carnegies.”40
Conversely, influential conservatives in antitrust’s
formative era favored aggressive antitrust enforcement
as an antidote to the simultaneous aggrandizement of
government and business. In the crucible election of
1912, William Howard Taft argued against Progressive
proposals to create a new Federal Trade Commission,
asserting
that
his
administration’s
aggressive
enforcement record demonstrated how traditional
prosecutorial and common law processes could obviate
the need to create new large governmental organizations
to combat big business.41 Taft’s pro-enforcement saber
rattling reached such a crescendo that Wall Street began

37 See Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur B.
Farquhar (Aug. 11, 1911), in THEODORE ROOSEVELT: LETTERS AND
SPEECHES 652, 652 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004).
38
MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916, at 344–46 (1988).
39 See generally Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust
Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1899) (reporting that socialists
favored consolidation as a means to nationalization).
40 Eugene Debs, A Study in Competition, in Appeal to Reason
(May 28, 1910), reprinted in Flehinger, at 162–63.
41 Daniel Crane, Progressivism and the 1912 Election, in THE
MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES, supra
note xxx, at 104, 105.
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to wonder whether Roosevelt might be the candidate
more sympathetic to their interests. 42
The New Deal, too, saw the Democratic Party
equivocate between contending Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian impulses on the question of governmental
and business scale. The first New Deal period—from
1933 to early 1935—was dominated by the National
Industrial
Recovery
Act,
which
encouraged
a
centralization of both governmental and industrial
power.43 Brandeis led the charge on the Supreme Court
to strike down the NIRA in 1935, warning the White
House that the Court would not tolerate continued
centralization of business or governmental power.44
From 1935 until the beginning of the war, the New Deal
administration followed a policy of aggressively
Brandeisian antitrust enforcement.45 Then, facing a
need to mobilize big business for the war effort, the
administration abruptly shifted course and embraced a
“business commonwealth” model of partnership between
big government and big business.46
After the war, the perception that industrial
concentration in Germany and Japan had fueled the rise
of fascism contributed to a two-decade period of
intensive antitrust enforcement—particularly against
mergers—launched by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.47
Here again, the ideology of the anti-monopoly movement
was ambiguous in conventional right/left terms. The
anti-monopolist Senator Kefauver warned that the
consequence of further industrial concentration would
Id. at 375.
Hawley, supra n. xxx.
44 Shortly before voting to strike down the NIRA in the
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining decisions, Brandeis
conveyed the following message to the White House: “This is the end
of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell
the President that we're not going to let this government centralize
everything. It's come to an end.” PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL
LAWYERS 104 (1982).
45 Hawley, supra n. xxx.
46 Id.
47 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1051 (1979).
42
43
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be government take-over, and that could lead either to
fascism, on the one hand, or socialism or communism,
on the other.48 Other proponents of the act argued that
the antitrust laws were “one of the greatest bulwarks
against communism,” and that the rising tide of
industrial concentration was driving the country toward
“collectivism.”49 It is no coincidence that the most anticonsolidationist statute in American history was passed
during the period of the Red Scare.
The ambiguity in the relationship between corporate
scale and governmental scale has translated into a
historical ambiguity in the politics of antitrust
enforcement. Just as the two major contemporary
political parties each blend contradictory Hamiltonian
and Jeffersonian elements, so too antitrust ideology has
not neatly tracked left/right dichotomies.
On a
statistical basis, civil antitrust enforcement by the
government peaked during the conservative Nixon and
Ford administrations.50 The Chicago School rode the
wave of Ronald Reagan’s decoupling of the curse of
bigness—bigness was a curse in the government only,
not in business.
But Chicago’s decoupling of the
ideological aversion to large scale in government and
business is not inevitable and may be, in historical
perspective, anomalous.
As historian Richard
Hofstadter has written, American feelings about large
organizational units in government and business have
generally tracked in parallel.
“From its colonial
beginnings through most of the nineteenth century . . .
Americans came to take it for granted that property
would be widely diffused, that economic and political
power would be decentralized.”51 The gradual public
acceptance of the rise of big business in the twentieth
century is attributable in part “to the emergence of
96 Cong. Rec. 16,452 (1950).
Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antirust
Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1982).
50 DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 37 (2011).
51 Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust
Movement, reprinted in Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at 227.
48
49
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countervailing bigness in government and labor.”52
Historically, it is no anomaly that small-government
conservatives would find common ground with
Brandeisian progressives in resenting the growth and
power of large-scale industrial firms, which are not so
easily distinguished from large-scale governmental
agencies.
II
THE SHIFTING MEANING OF “MONOPOLY” AND CONTESTATION
OVER ITS SOURCES
A. What Is a “Monopoly?”
The ideological valence of the anti-monopoly
principle is ambiguous in contemporary left/right terms,
owing in large part to a historical shift in the meaning of
the word “monopoly,” particularly in its popular and
pejorative senses. Is a monopolist a private firm that
corners a market through nefarious shrewd tactics? If
so, the law’s anti-monopoly response codes “regulatory”
and “interventionist” in right/left terms.
Or is a
“monopoly” a cronyist intervention by the state to
prevent free market competition? In that case, the antimonopoly principle codes as “deregulatory” and “free
market.” Both of these senses of “monopoly” have been
used historically, and their contemporary manifestations
remain tangled.
The first sense of “monopoly”—of purely private
market
power—has
a
long-standing
historical
resonance. Legal regulation of private monopoly and
unfair competition reportedly extends back as far as the
Code of Hammurabi.53
A primordial antitrust case
against grain dealers appears in fourth century B.C.
Athens.54 One finds an anti-monopoly sentiment
Id. at 238.
FRITZ MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY (1952).
54
Lambros
E.
Kotsiris, An Antitrust Case in Ancient Greek Law, 22 Int'l Law. 451,
454 (1988).
52
53
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expressed in ninth century B.C. Chinese thought on the
ground that it increased prices to consumers.55 A
similar sentiment appears in early Islamic law56 and in a
fifth century decree of the Byzantine Emperor Zeno and
the Justinian Code.57
A generally moralist antimonopoly strand runs through the Christian tradition
from the medieval scholastics to the Protestant
reformers.58 The earliest common law cases vitiating
private monopolies date from the fourteenth century.59
On the other hand, constitutional historians
recognize a longstanding anti-monopoly tradition—
defined by such attributes as prohibitions on
governmental cronyism and special grants of economic
privilege—in Anglo-American jurisprudence.60 Debates
over corporate chartering and monopoly pervaded the
Founding Era and continued through the Jacksonian
period and into the corporate liberalizations of the late
nineteenth century.61 Anti-monopoly themes played an
important role in many of the landmark cases of U.S.
constitutional law on such matters as the limits of
CHEN HUAN-CHENG, THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF CONFUCIUS
HIS SCHOOL 534 (1911).
56 Arvie Johan, Monopoly Prohibition According to Islamic Law:
A
Law
and
Economics
Approach,
https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jmh/article/viewFile/15904/10513
("Whoever withholds food (in order to raise its price), has certainly
erred!").
57 S.P. Scott, 13 The Civil Law 120 (1932) (translating book IV,
title 59 of the Code of Justinian) (prohibiting monopolies and cartels
upon pain of confiscation and banishment).
58 See Kenneth Elzinga & Daniel A. Crane, Christianity and
Antitrust, in CHRISTIANITY AND ECONOMIC REGULATION (Daniel A. Crane
& Samuel Gregg, forthcoming Cambridge University Press).
59 William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning
Monopolies, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355, 356-58 (1954).
60 See, e.g., Kenneth Lipartito, The Antimonopoly Tradition, 10
U. St. Thomas L.J. 991 (2013); Steven C. Calabresi & Larissa C.
Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony
Capitalism, 36 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol’y 983 (2013); Michael
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition under the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 Emory L.J.
785 (1982).
61 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2008).
55
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federal power,62 the impairment by states of obligations
of contract,63 and the reach of the Reconstruction
Amendments.64 Indeed, the constitutional-democratic
sense of the anti-monopoly tradition predates the
American political order, with deep roots in the British
common law.
Sir Edward Coke argued that all
monopolies were against Magna Carta because they
stood against liberty and freedom,65 and the Case
Against Monopolies asserted Parliamentary jurisdiction
over the grant of monopolies.66
Throughout much of the Anglo-American antimonopoly tradition, “monopoly” primarily denoted a
governmental grant of an exclusive privilege—a “letter
patent” in the sense of the classic common law case: The
Case Against Monopolies.67 Until the late nineteenth
century, the American anti-monopoly tradition was
concerned primarily with governmental cronyism and
exclusive privilege. As late as 1878, Thomas Cooley
devoted the principal thrust of his essay on limits to
state control of private business to the problem of stategranted monopoly, turning only in the last few pages to
the subsidiary problem “[o]f monopolies not created by
the legislature.”68
Over time, however, the primary legal meaning of
“monopoly” has shifted from the government-granted to
the purely private. This shift became apparent in U.S.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)).
64 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
65 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND
OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 181
(Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1644)).
66 Darcy v. Allen (The Case Against Monopolies), 11 Coke 84,
77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603).
67 See Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47
YALE L. J. 34, 44 (1937) (discussing shift in meaning of word
“monopoly” from exclusion of others from the market by a sovereign
dispensation in favor of one seller” to “broad sense of restriction of
competition.”).
68 Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private
Business, reprinted in Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx, at 67.
62
63
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antitrust law in 1943, when, in Parker v. Brown,69 the
U.S. Supreme Court held the Sherman Act inapplicable
to anticompetitive structures created by state regulation.
Parker grew out of the Supreme Court’s post-1937
constitutional jurisprudence rejecting Lochner-era
judicial scrutiny of regulatory schemes impairing
property or contract rights.70 Just as the post-1937
constitutional dispensation would avoid secondguessing state regulatory judgments in favor of judicially
preferred economic theories, so too the courts would
reject efforts to use the Sherman Act to the same effect
(to the dismay of conservatives, who favored the
judiciary as a bulwark against over regulation).
From one perspective, Parker stood the meaning of
“monopoly” on its head.71
Whereas, the primary
meaning of “monopoly” in the Anglo-American tradition
had been a governmental grant of exclusive privilege—
an interference with the natural rights of other market
participants—that primary sense of “monopoly” was now
to be excluded altogether from the Sherman Act’s antimonopoly legal regime.
Only purely private
monopolies—the second sense of the word discussed
above—would be covered by antitrust.
The Parker doctrine of state action immunity from
antitrust has not developed to immunize state regulation
from Sherman Act preemption as strongly as Parker’s
language would suggest, and the doctrine’s evolution
continues.72 In the push-and-pull over the doctrine’s
boundaries, it has largely been advocates of the Chicago
School’s consumer welfare approach that have argued
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Daniel A. Crane & Adam Hester, State-Action Immunity and
Section 5 of the FTC Act, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (2016).
71
Richard A. Epstein, Symposium, The Proper Goals of
Antitrust: When Public and Private Interests Collide, 9 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV.. 112, 125 (1997) (“What happens
[under Parker] is that this legal regime marks a complete inversion
of the proper approach. State-sponsored cartels in the aftermath of
the New Deal legitimation are more permanent and more dangerous
than privately-operated ones, but they are given complete immunity
from the antitrust act.”).
72 Crane & Hester, supra n. xxx.
69
70
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for narrowing state action immunity on the view that
states systematically distort competitive processes for
the benefit of rent-seekers.73 This simultaneously proantitrust and deregulatory perspective tracks that
strand of the anti-monopoly tradition accusing the
government as culprit.
B. Are
Private
Monopolies
Governmental Intervention?

the

Product

of

This ambiguity over the meaning of “monopoly” and
its attendant legal and policy implications cashes out
also in legal and economic discourse over the sources of
monopoly power. A neo-classical economic view, today
associated with Chicago School ideology, holds that
markets are contestable and that any monopoly power
gained through anticompetitive means is quickly eroded,
but with one important exception:
governmentally
created entry barriers.74 If regulation and governmental
Id. at xxx (arguing for more preemptive role for FTC Act over
anticompetitive state regulations that harm competition and
consumer welfare); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the
Economics of Federalism, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT:
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 189-213 (Richard A.
Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds, 2004) (proposing modification to
Parker immunity doctrine to curb excesses of state anticompetitive
regulation); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Chicago School and
Exclusionary Conduct, 31 Harv. J. Law & Public Pol’y 439, 446
(2008) (discussing Robert Bork’s concern about use of government
as agent of exclusion); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S.
Greve, Introduction, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT, supra,
at 1, 13 (describing the Parker doctrine as enabling mutual
exploitation of citizens by the states).
74 See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era:
Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroad and Public Utility
Regulation, 70 Va. L. Rev. 187, 202-03 (1984 (examining
neoclassical view that only monopolies created by law were
durable); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 129-31 (2d ed.
1982)
(discussing
problem
of
government-created
labor
monopolies); Howard P. Marvel, Hybrid Trade Restraints: The Legal
Limits of a Government’s Helping Hand, 2 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 165,
180 (1983) (“Government may or may not be the source of
all monopolies; it is clearly at the heart of a substantial number
of monopolies.”); Bork, supra n. xxx at 347-64 (examining
73
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favoritism are the only important sources of durable
monopoly power, then one potential policy response is
not to worry about privately acquired monopoly—
essentially, to turn the Parker state action immunity
regime on its head and only police state-granted
monopolies. But there is another possibility flowing
from the opening premise, which is to hold that any
observed instances of genuinely durable monopoly
power must be owing to some seen or unseen
governmental distortion. In this latter view, when what
at first blush may seem to be purely private monopoly
power persists over time, there must be some underlying
governmental distortion accounting for it. Then, even
committed
libertarians
should
favor
antitrust
intervention to terminate the monopoly.
This view is not hypothetical; it explains some of the
right’s historical affinity for antitrust enforcement
despite the right’s otherwise laissez faire predilections.
The clearest case in point is the 1983 consent decree
breaking up of AT&T.
How did the largest antimonopoly corporate break-up in history occur at the
hands of the Reagan Administration and its decidedly
Chicago School Justice Department? The answer lies in
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baxter’s conviction that
AT&T was exploiting its status as a regulated monopolist
to stifle competition.75 What has come to be known as
“Baxter’s law” posits that rate-regulated monopolists
may extract monopoly profits from vertically integrated
markets without running afoul of the “one monopoly
profit” theorem.76 Suspecting government regulation as
the deep source of AT&T’s persistent monopolistic

predation through governmental process, which Bork described as
a serious and growing problem).
75 Lawrence A. Sullivan & Ellen Hertz, The AT&T Antitrust
Consent Decree: Should Congress Change the Rules?, 5 High. Tech.
L. J. 233, 238 (1990).
76 William F. Baxter, Conditions Creating Antitrust Concern
with Vertical Integration by Regulated Industries--“For Whom the Bell
Doctrine Tolls,” 52 Antitrust L.J. 243 (1983); see generally Tim Wu,
Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 Va.
L. Rev. 123, 139 (2006).
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behavior, the conservative Reagan Administration was
willing to break it up.
Similar suspicions that Big Tech companies like
Google and Facebook are the monopolistic beneficiaries
of subtle governmental cronyism show up today on the
political right.77 That Big Tech tends to be associated
politically with the Democratic Party only furthers these
perceptions.78
Those
inherently
suspicious
of
governmental interventions in markets may understand
Big Tech as the unnatural spawn of governmentally
granted privilege and private greed. Conversely, those
more sympathetic to governmental intervention may find
nothing alarming about the multiple ways in which Big
Tech appropriates governmental benefits through such
vehicles as intellectual property law, government
subsidies, or the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. But
these matters divide the left as well. The Open Markets
Institute was forced out of the progressive-leaning New
America Foundation over Open Markets’ criticisms of
Google.79 In light of the contestable boundaries of the
public/private divide and the shifting meaning of
monopoly, it is not surprising to see political alliances
fraying over antitrust reform.
III
PRAGMATIC CONCERNS OVER ANTITRUST’S ALTERNATIVES AND
CAPITALISM’S SURVIVAL
A final reason that the politics of antitrust
sometimes confound conventional left/right divides has
to do the pragmatic sense that some regulatory
interventions may be necessary to preserve capitalism
E.g., Seton Motley, Democrats Want Big Government Crony
Socialism—Why Are Some Republicans Giving It to Them?,
https://www.redstate.com/diary/setonmotley/2015/07/08/democ
rats-want-big-government-crony-socialism-republicans-giving/.
78 See Ryan Grim, Steve Bannon Wants Facebook and Google
Regulated
Like
Utilities,
https://theintercept.com/2017/07/27/steve-bannon-wantsfacebook-and-google-regulated-like-utilities/.
79 Supra n. xxx.
77
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politically, and that antitrust may be the least
objectionable one. This “antitrust or else” perspective
has characterized the politics of antitrust from the
beginning.
The conventional view that the Congress intended
the Sherman Act seriously to undermine the trusts is
balderdash. “[T]he Republican Party, in control of the
51st Congress, was ‘itself dominated at the time by many
of the very industrial magnates most vulnerable to real
antitrust legislation.’”80 A more realistic view is that the
51st Congress passed the Sherman Act to avert more
radical reforms. Speaking on the Senate floor in 1890,
Senator John Sherman warned his brethren, many of
whom were controlled by the trusts, that Congress
“must heed [the public’s] appeal or be ready for the
socialist, the communist, and the nihilist.”81 Sherman
thus conceived of his eponymous antitrust statute as
politically necessary to diffuse more radical political
movements—as a sort of Band-aid on capitalism.
The idea that antitrust legislation and enforcement
are necessary accommodations to public demand has a
long pedigree in both conservative and more progressive
circles. Writing in 1914, William Howard Taft described
the Sherman Act as “a step taken by Congress to meet
what the public had found to be a growing and
intolerable evil.”82 Notably, Taft did not own the public’s
concern himself, nor attribute such a concern to
Congress. Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt was relatively
unconcerned with the trusts personally, but, “saw the
trust problem as something that must be dealt with on
the political level; public concern about it was too urgent
to be ignored.”83
Beyond the concern that, absent antitrust,
WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT (1965) (quoting MERLE FAINSOD &
LINCOLN GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 450
(1941)).
81 See also 21 Cong. Rec. 2460, 2460 (1890).
82 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME
COURT 2 (1914).
83 Hofstadter, supra n. xxx at 232.
80
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capitalism itself might succumb to reformist pressures,
there is a more modest possibility that, absent antitrust,
political pressures would lead to overregulation.
Antitrust
and
administrative
regulation
are
conventionally viewed as alternatives to address market
failures.
From the Reagan Administration to the
Financial Crisis of 2008, the overall arc of American law
involved simultaneous deregulation and relaxation of
antitrust enforcement. If popular dissatisfaction with
the economic status quo grows, demand might grow to
pull either the regulatory or antitrust lever. Those
ideologically committed to a light governmental hand on
the market might prefer the antitrust alternative.
It is hard to judge at any given moment how much
political support for antitrust intervention is motivated
by genuine concern over monopoly and competition, and
how much of it derives from the fact that, in the face of
popular demand for a governmental cure to a perceived
evil, it is often easier to delegate the solution to antitrust
than to propose a regulatory solution.
From the
Sherman Act forward, however, it is certain that
antitrust has often been deployed as a foil to more
interventionist forms of regulation. The ideological and
political implications of that move are complex and not
neatly housed in right/left categories.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust is back on the menu. Given the ebb-andflow patterns of antitrust enforcement in American
history, that should come as no surprise. Nor should it
be surprising that the pressures for enhanced antitrust
enforcement are coming from both wings of the political
spectrum, as is the defense of the incumbent consumer
welfare regime.
Despite the appearance of a
conventional right/left divide over antitrust enforcement
since the 1970s, in broader historical perspective the
ideological lines over monopoly and competition are far
less determined.
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